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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE-BIBLE READ-
ING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS-The plaintiff, as a citizen, taxpayer, and 
parent of school children, sought an injunction to restrain the defendant 
school board from allowing school teachers to read the Bible aloud to 
students as required by a Tennessee statute.1 The plaintiff contended 
that this practice was offensive to him and in violation of the Tennessee2 
and United States3 Constitutions. The trial court sustained defendant's 
demurrer. On appeal, held, affirmed. The statute violates neither con-
stitution because it is not an interference with students' or parents' re-
ligious beliefs. Carden v. Bland, (Tenn. 1956) 288 S. W. (2d) 718. 
In interpreting state constitutions, state courts rarely sustain objec-
tions to Bible reading in the public schools.4 In essence these courts 
reason, as does the principal case, that young people ought to be taught 
not to forget God.5 The state decisions usually assign some combination 
of the following reasons for this attitude: only sectarianism or preference 
l Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §2343. "It shall be the duty of the teacher: 
• • • (4) To read, or cause to be read, at the opening of the school every day, a selection 
from the Bible and the same selection shall not be read more than twice a month." 
2 TENN. CONST., art. 1, §3: "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience; that no man 
can, of right, be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to 
maintain any minister, against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case 
whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall 
ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode of worship." 
3 U.S. CONST., Amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ••.. " U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV: 
" ••• nor shall any State deprive any person of ••• liberty ••• without due process 
of law •... " 
4 See Keesecker, "Legal Status of Bible Reading and Religious Instruction in the 
Public Schools," United States Office of Education Bulletin, No. 14 (1930), in which the 
leading cases are abstracted and discussed. Contra: Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 
226 N.W. 348 (1929); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177 (1890); People 
ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910); Miller v. Cooper, 
56 N.M. 355,244 P. (2d) 520 (1952); Herold v. Parish Board, 136 La. 1034, 68 S. 116 (1915). 
5 Principal case at 725. 
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for a particular sect is forbidden, and the Bible is non-sectarian;6 the 
public welfare requires moral training, and the Bible is a good moral 
textbook;7 Bible reading does not make the school a place of worship or 
a seminary which the state has established or taxpayers are compelled to 
support;8 if Bible reading does convert the school into a place of worship, 
it does not increase the citizen's tax burden;9 it is a policy question 
exclusively for the legislature;10 it is a question within the proper discre-
tion of the school board;11 if the state allows children to be excused on 
their parents' request, they are not compelled to attend a place of worship.12 
The Tennessee court's interpretation of the Tennessee Constitution is, 
therefore, well in line with the current of state authority, but its in-
terpretation of the United States Constitution seems open to question. 
The First Amendment, which has been transmitted as a limitation on 
the powers of state governments through the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,13 is double-barrelled: a state can neither estab-
lish a religion nor prohibit the free exercise thereof. At times it seems 
impossible to obey one mandate without infringing the other, as in 
the case of public transportation for parochial students,14 but the principal 
case seems to stand directly in the line of fire of both barrels. As to 
the non-prohibition clause, which has been fairly well defined in the 
many cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses,15 it would seem that compulsory 
Bible reading interferes with the religious liberty of one whose church 
forbids Bible reading without doctrinal interpretation,16 fully as much as 
does a compulsory flag salute with that of a Jehovah's Witness, whose 
church forbids saluting the American flag, as equivalent to the worship 
of idols.17 As to the non-establishment clause, which has been less litigated 
6 Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A. (2d) 857 (1953); Doremus v. 
Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A. (2d) 880 (1950). Contra, McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
'1 Hart v. Sharpsville Borough School District, 2 Lane. (Pa.) 346 (1885). 
s People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927). 
9 Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475 (1884). 
10 Kaplan v. Independent School District, 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927). Contra, 
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by courts." West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 638 (1942). 
11 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854). 
12 Moore v. Monroe, note 9 supra. 
13 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, note 10 supra; Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
14 The dilemma: Is it an establishment of religion to pay Catholic students' bus 
fare to a parochial school, or would it be restricting their religious liberty not to pay 
their bus fare? The Supreme Court has held that paying the bus fare of Catholic students 
was not an establishment of religion because it was in the interests of the public welfare. 
Four justices dissented. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947). 
15 Cantwell v. Connecticut, note 13 supra. 
16 Donahoe v. Richards, note 11 supra. 
17West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, note 10 supra. But see 
Frankfurter's dissent in that case. 
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and is consequently of less certain meaning, it seems that the statute in 
the principal case is far on the unconstitutional side of the line drawn 
in recent United States Supreme Court decisions,18 however fuzzy that 
line may be. At the minimum these cases held that religious instruction 
by private teachers during school hours violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when it involved the use of state compulsory school attendance 
machinery, tax-supported classrooms, and close cooperation between 
church and school officials. The principal case not only involved direct 
official compulsion, without the alternative of non-attendance, and the 
use of tax-supported classrooms, but also Bible reading by state-paid 
teachers. There is a general limitation on the doctrine requiring 
separation of church and state, however, which permits certain public 
activities which indirectly benefit a particular church group, when those 
activities are in the interest of public welfare.19 To uphold the Tennessee 
statute as moral training for the public welfare would be a considerable 
extension of this doctrine. If a statute such as the one in the principal 
case were brought before the Supreme Court and held unconstitutional, 
it would be necessary for the Court to draw another line: To what 
extent will the Bible be permitted in the public schools for purposes of 
cultural instruction? This line-drawing process is inevitable since the 
Court has taken upon itself the determination of what is God's and what 
is Caesar's. 
Frederic F. Brace, Jr. 
18 McCollum v. Board of Education, note 6 supra; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952). Note also the Court's indication of its intention to scrutinize more closely its 
jurisdiction in this class of cases. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
These cases might indicate a trend allowing more leeway to the states in such matters. 
19 Everson v. Board of Education, note 14 supra, at 18 where public transportation 
for parochial students was held valid as "a general program to help parents get their 
children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited 
schools." 
